Insights on Impact of Distributed Ledgers in Provider Networks

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Outline

Research Questions Insights on Impact of Distributed Ledgers in Provider Networks Introduction Communication in a DLT Interactions **Comm.** Patterns **Challenges for Users and Provider Networks Experimental Insights Topological Meas. Types of DLT Peers Costs for Establishment and Maintenance** Discussion **Further Work and Next Steps**



Research Questions



Research Questions

Q1: What is the impact of DCSs on provider networks?

• Outcomes: (a) insights on mechanisms & (b) quantifications

Q2: What network innovations could reduce the impact of the issues identified in Q1?

• Outcomes: (a) design of network mechanisms & (b) quantification of improvements

Q3: How could the presence of network innovations inform/guide better designs for DCSs?

• Outcomes: (a) design of new DLT mechanism(s) & (b) quantification



Why do we actually care?



FLP Relaxation

Deterministic consensus in asynchronous networks -> FLP Impossibility

Randomized Algorithm: A consensus is always reachable in a **network**, but the time needed to reach consensus may be unbounded [1].

Disseminate information through the network







Randomized Distributed Consensus

Deterministic atomic broadcast: is a broadcast which guarantees that all participants in a system eventually receive the same sequence of messages [3].





Randomized Distributed Consensus

Randomized atomic broadcast: is a broadcast performed on random samples of the network which guarantees that all participants in a system eventually receive the same sequence of messages. Diffusion mechanism.



Atomicu Broadoas Approved Unicast

Large scale overlay systems build on top of IP networks, UDP and TCP based.



Communication Patterns



Discovery and Pool Establishment enabling randomized communication algorithms



Challenges for Users and Provider Networks

- Costs for pool maintenance:
 - Peers need to continuously establish and maintain reachability information
 - Each DLT peer maintaining a constantly changing pool (TCP)
- Costs for resilience and reliability:
 - Failing nodes causing latency on pool establishment (hence DC)
 - Timeouts inducing removal of peers, replenishing the pool
- Need to match capabilities:
 - Upper layer capabilities are required for pool.
- Unicast Replication
 - intention to achieve diffusion among many DLT peers instead of efficient network-level multicast.
- IP address privacy
 - DLT peers need to expose their IP address



What did we do to answer Q1?





Experimental Insights

- Go-ethereum client syncronizing to the ethereum mainnet ٠
- Geth/v1.10.2-stable ٠
- Local peer on : 217.110.131.84 ٠
- UDP/TCP ports : 30303,30313 ٠
- Samples taken between : Jan-2022 Jun-2022 ٠
- 8 bootstrap endpoints with v4UDP discover protocol ٠
- Discovered active peers: 72k in comparison to [Gao 2018] 74k ٠
- 100 iterations: ٠
 - SYNC [5hrs]
 - STOP[2mins] • Discovery / Pool Establishment [40min]SYNC[4hrs20min]
- Downloaded data : ~280GB ٠

	65	
	2.	
1.1		



Experimental Insights Topological Meas.



Clusters



Experimental Insights Topological Meas.



- X_min=71
- Xmax=1844



Experimental Insights Topological Meas.



Fig. 3. (a) Incoming Connection Reachability, (b) Outgoing Connection Reachability

- Clustered
- Incoming communication relations 10x



Type of DLT Peers

Table 1. Type of Peers

Peer	Outgoing $[\%]$	Avg.	Incoming [%]	Avg.	1a 1 Load Bootstrap Nodes to List of DLT peers 2a Pick a Page from List of DLT page	Slow Down No Pool of DLT Peers < N
Non-Reachable Signaling	$5.17 \\ 87.1$	$353.22 \\ 6011.29$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \\ 76.78 \end{array}$	1.87 10259.56	A rect area for DL1 peers Peer contacted in the last 24hrs? 3a \$\frac{\phi No}{2}\$ Ensure Reachability through UDP PING/PONG \$\phi \frac{\phi}{2}\$ Reachable	Yes Yes Pick a Peer from List of DLT peers Local ETH ID Resolution Local ETH ID Resolution through UDP ETH ID not in cache Network ETH ID Resolution through UDP ETH ID not resolved ETH ID not resolved
Potential Data	7.73	540.7	23.19	3098.35	4a No ↓ Yes Discover Peers through UDP FINDNODE	Establish TCP Transport Security Failed
Data	0.002	0.111	0.013	1.667	5a Ves Add Discovered Peers to List of DLT peers	Add Peer to Pool of DLT Peers
Dropped Data	0.005	0.302	0.005	0.302	List of DLT Peers	Pool of DLT Peers Maintain Pool of DLT Peers



Pool Establishment Time



Fig. 4. (a) Single Sample for Pool Establishment Time, (b) $t_{N/3}$, (c) t_N

 tN/3, is reached at 4min with 50%probability, while the time to complete a pool of DLT peers is reached at 20min



Pool Establishment Cost - Discovery



Fig. 5. (a-d) Outgoing, and (e-h) Incoming Discovery KPI Distributions

				Incoming								
	Power-Law			Log-Normal			Po	wer-L	aw	Log-Normal		
RV	α	x_{min}	p	μ	σ^2	x_{min}	α	x_{min}	p	μ	σ^2	x_{min}
Attempts	5.24	604	0.2	6.31	0.38	336	4.6	620	0.58	6.47	0.37	423
Reachability	3.87	346	0.03	6.04	0.41	257	4.58	619	0.59	6.47	0.37	423
Disc. Attempt	6.22	269	0.79	5.61	0.21	164	3.59	732	0.16	6.79	0.41	480
Disc. Success	6.16	161	0.04	5.07	0.21	98	3.86	785	0.11	6.72	0.43	459



Pool Establishment Cost - Discovery

≈77% of the contacted peers are reachable, out of these peers≈63% are used to further topology discovery, and≈57% successfully executed a complete discovery protocol. almost all the reachability requests were positively replied by our peer, and≈94% of the discovery requests are successfully completed.



Fig. 6. (a) Outgoing, and (b) Incoming Discovery Cost



Pool Establishment Cost



Fig. 8. (a) Outgoing, and (b) Incoming Pool Establishment Cost

 outgoing peers have significantly higher transport and security failures, where 82% of errors occur while trying to decrypt the remote secret and find the proper blockchain checkpoint, and18% I/O errors (invalid ciphertext length, unexpected end of file); we currently explain this issue with stored but outdated cypher information



Impact on Provider Networks: Effective Data Consumption

- Downloaded data amounted 3168G, out of which 892G were useful data added to the local blockchain, while 2276G were dropped.
- We interpret this as an effective data consumption ratio of 28.15%.



Further Work



Further Research Question

Q1: What is the impact of DLT solutions on provider networks?

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Q2: What network innovations could reduce the impact of the issues identified in Q1?

- **Problem to solve:** Permissionless DCS fundamentally based on utilizing an instantaneously randomized broadcast to a fixed size group among a subset of miners that fit particular constraints
- Observations
 - 1. Miners provide a service capability to other miners and clients in the DLT
 - 2. Pool creation and maintenance (done at EVERY peer) is core mechanism to enable instantaneously randomized operations
 - 3. Constraints (as investigated in ETH) include reachability, TLS capabilities, certain HW, checkpoint, ...
 - 4. Fixed group size is defined through heuristics (theoretical bounds) on the probability for converging to consensus among those group members
 - 5. A group of members is instantaneously randomized to ensure protection against collusion

From observations/insights to a proposed design

- 1. Use service-centric abstraction (miners are service instances to DLT service)
- 2. Use (service) routes to (pool of) service instances as key concept to enable instantaneously randomized operations
- 3. Replace pool maintenance by encoding constraints that ensure successful communication as naming structure
- 4. Provide a forward multicast capability to a fixed size subset of constrained named service instances
- 5. Ensure that fixed size is randomized with every request (which excludes the use of IP multicast)
- Reducing impact on network (compared to ETH over IP)
 - From requiring pool maintenance to using service route announcements
 - From waste in pool maintenance due to, e.g., lack of reachability, mismatching capabilities, to service route convergence
 - -> Baseline here will be our insights (in terms of convergence latency, pool latency, pool maintenance cost) in ETH over IP



Questions



Thank you.

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Pool Establishment Cost



Fig. 7. (a-d) Outgoing, and (e-h) Incoming Pool Establishment KPI Distributions

		Outgoing						Incoming					
	Power-Law			Log-Normal			Power-Law			Log-Normal			
\mathbf{RV}	α	x_{min}	p	μ	σ^2	x_{min}	α	x_{min}	p	μ	σ^2	x_{min}	
Attempts	4.52	2250	0.33	7.78	0.29	1041	4.81	1973	0.43	7.6	0.29	1063	
Transport Security	3.6	23	0.69	3.09	0.56	5	3.03	93	0.62	4.63	0.62	36	
Capability Protocol	4.37	1777	0.25	7.57	0.3	845	6.71	83	0.86	4.32	0.26	44	
Capability Checkpoint	5.31	114	0.25	4.73	0.31	42	5.52	286	0.46	5.63	0.28	127	
Establishment Success	6.21	350	0.26	5.74	0.28	144	5.04	1383	0.75	7.24	0.3	825	



A Primer on Distributed Consensus

Consensus: several processes/peers need to agree on a single value

Some processes may be malicious: <=f out of n=3f+1

State-machine replication (SMR): processes/peers agree on a sequence of values – commands to change the replicated state

Blockchain (a.k.a DLTs): using Byzantine SMR to agree on a sequence of blocks in a ledger. [2]



Byzantine Consensus

Byzantine consensus: hard decision finality, but **permissioned** system – fixed set of participants [2].

Blockchain consensus (PoW): no hard (deterministic) finality guarantees, but **permissionless** system – anyone can participate [2].

Using Byzantine consensus for blockchain: elect a committee to finalize decisions via Byzantine consensus.



Byzantine Consensus

At its heart: network (understanding its features, characteristics)

Synchronous network: there is a known fixed upper bound **D** on the time required for a message to be sent from one processor/peer to another, and a known fixed **f** upper bound on the relative speeds of different processors [1].

Asynchronous network: no fixed upper bounds D and f exist [1].

Partial synchrony: fixed bounds **D** and **f** exist, but they are not known a priori [1].



Byzansting Konsensus - Fisher Lynch Paterson (FLP)

Fisher Lynch Paterson (FLP) Impossibility: a consensus protocol that works in an asynchronous model also works in a synchronous model.

A synchronous model has modifications and restrictions on an asynchronous model so that the synchronous model is closer to the real scenarios and it is **possible to solve the consensus problem** in practice.

FLP indicates that consensus is not always **reachable in bounded** time in asynchronous networks. [4]



Byzantine Consensus - Pick 2 out of 3

Fault tolerance requires that a protocol must also effective in case of node failures.

Agreement (Safety) means that the values reached across nodes in a system are consistent and valid



Termination (Liveness) indicates that individual nodes in a system must reach an agreement (in bounded time), that is, the system must move forward and cannot always be in the inconsistency state.

Example: we can sacrifice a certain degree of safety, which means that the system can always reach an agreement quickly but the agreement is not very reliable.



Types of Endpoints in a Deployed DLT





peer

- [1] Consensus in the Presence of Partial Synchrony. Dwork, Lynch and Stockmeyer. ACM on Distributed Computing. 1984
- [2] Liveness in PBFT. Gotsman Alexander. 2022
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- [5] A Survey and Comparison of Peer-to-Peer Overlay Network Schemes. Eng Keong Lua, Jon Crowcroft, Marcelo Pias, Ravi Sharma and Steven Lim. IEEE Survey. 2004

